Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 54

Issue 3

Note

2006

Improvident Extension of Credit as an Extension of
Unconscionability: Discover Bank v. Owens and a Debtor's Rights
against Credit Card Companies
Terri Rebecca Daniel

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Note, Improvident Extension of Credit as an Extension of Unconscionability: Discover Bank v. Owens and
a Debtor's Rights against Credit Card Companies, 54 Clev. St. L. Rev. 435

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

IMPROVIDENT EXTENSION OF CREDIT AS AN EXTENSION
OF UNCONSCIONABLITY: DISCOVER BANK V. OWENS1 AND A
DEBTOR’S RIGHTS AGAINST CREDIT CARD COMPANIES
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 436
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY .......................................................... 437
III. THE HISTORY OF IMPROVIDENT EXTENSION OF CREDIT ...... 440
A. Model State Collection Act .......................................... 441
B. National Bankruptcy Conference Committee .............. 442
C. Uniform Consumer Credit Code.................................. 444
D. National Commission on Consumer Finance .............. 444
E. Vern Countryman’s Proposal ...................................... 445
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF IMPROVIDENT EXTENSION
OF CREDIT ............................................................................ 446
A. Market Securitization................................................... 446
B. The Repeal of Usury Laws and the Impact
of Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v.
First of Omaha Service Corp. ...................................... 447
1. The History of the Credit Card Industry............... 447
2. Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v.
First of Omaha Service Corp. .............................. 449
V. A GREATER NEED FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION ................. 452
A. New Tools for the Industry .......................................... 452
1. Annual Fees .......................................................... 452
2. Complex Contract Terms ..................................... 452
3. Higher Credit Lines and Penalty Fees .................. 453
B. The Legality of Penalty Fees and Smiley v. Citibank . 454
VI. INADEQUATE SOLUTIONS ..................................................... 455
A. Market Self-Regulation................................................ 456
B. Credit Counseling and Educational Programs ........... 457
C. Unconscionability ........................................................ 457
VII. A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION:
DISCOVER BANK V. OWENS.................................................... 458
A. Facts ............................................................................ 458
B. Court’s Rationale......................................................... 459
C. City Financial Services v. Smith ................................. 461
VIII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS........................................................... 462
IX. CONCLUSION........................................................................ 464
1

822 N.E.2d 869 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Clev. 2004).

435

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006

1

436

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:435

I. INTRODUCTION
We receive them in the mail every day: materials from credit card companies,
ranging from applications to cards pre-printed with our names and information.
Most of us understand these unsolicited mailings to be mere attempts to gain
business. But imagine that you are poor, uneducated, perhaps even mentally ill, and
you have trouble providing for yourself and your family. Will you understand the
significance of a credit card and its underlying responsibility? Should you be
expected to? You did not request the card and may even believe it to be a gift or a
form of assistance. You call the number on the back of the card to activate it and
begin charging necessities for your family. You may charge only a few dollars, or
perhaps you charge thousands of dollars worth of goods and services. Either way,
you cannot possibly pay off the amount, so the bill continues to grow with fees and
interest. Over time, you owe more money in fees and interest than you ever charged.
Should you be responsible for your charges, interest, and fees?
Some attorneys encounter this very situation every day: people who have very
little money ring up thousands of dollars in credit card bills. They may or may not
understand the workings of a credit card, but none of them can pay the bill. Some of
these individuals have done this before; they are repeat offenders who are on
payment plans or who have already had their debts discharged in bankruptcy. Yet
they still receive credit card applications every day, some from the same companies
with which they have previously had credit card problems. Is there a point where
some of the responsibility should shift to the credit card companies?
Yes, responsibility should shift to the credit card company through the doctrine
of improvident extension of credit. As defined by Vern Countryman,2 an
improvident extension of credit is:
[A] contractual extension of credit to a debtor where it cannot reasonably
be expected that the debtor can repay the debt according to the terms of
the agreement . . . in view of the circumstances of the debtor at the time
credit was extended as these circumstances were known to the creditor or
would have been revealed to him on reasonable inquiry prior to credit
extension.3
Improvident extension of credit, discussed heavily in the 1960s and 1970s, has
resurfaced as a defense to breach of contract claims in recent years. The defense is

2
Vern Countryman was a professor at Harvard Law School and a specialist in commercial
law, bankruptcy law and reform, secured transactions law, and civil liberties. HLS’ Vern
Countryman Dies, HARVARD UNIVERSITY GAZETTE, May 13, 1999, available at http://www.
hno.harvard.edu/gazette/1999/05.13/Countryman.obit.html. Countryman not only defined
improvident extension of credit, but was an advocate for its codification for decades.
Margaret Howard, Vern Countryman and Barry Zaretsky: A Legacy of Ideas, 75 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 283, 294 (2001). Ultimately, he was unsuccessful in his attempts to introduce the concept
into law. Id. Countryman has been called “a voice in the wilderness, although everything he
said twenty and thirty years ago still has relevance today.” Id.
3

Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning?, 27
ME. L. REV. 1, 23 (1975).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss3/9

2

2006]

IMPROVIDENT EXTENSION OF CREDIT

437

largely unsuccessful, and creditors generally prevail in cases against debtors.4
However, in 2004, a municipal court judge in Cleveland, Ohio proved to be
sympathetic to an impoverished debtor representing herself against a large credit
card company.5 The judge6 did not use the term improvident extension of credit, but
the theory resonates in the judge’s rationale. While Vern Countryman and his
colleagues did not discuss credit card lending in terms of improvident extension of
credit,7 this doctrine and its underlying theories should be extended to all consumer
credit, including credit card lending, in the form of federal statutory law or in the
alternative, favorable court decisions for the debtor.
This note will examine improvident extension of credit as an extension of
unconscionability in consumer credit card lending. Part II of this note will discuss
the history and foundation of unconscionability. Part III will discuss the history and
foundation of improvident extension of credit, as well as the many failed attempts to
create a solution to the problem of improvident extension of credit in the United
States. Part IV of this note will analyze the current role of improvident lending in
consumer credit and why no solution was reached in the 1970s. Part V will examine
the increased need for consumer protection in the last few decades. Part VI will
discuss the inadequate solutions proposed to resolve the issue of improvident
extension of credit in society. Part VII will examine Discover Bank v. Owens,8 a
recent case holding in favor of a debtor. Finally, Part VIII will discuss the need to
readdress the lack of statutory law on the subject of improvident extension of credit
and offer several possible solutions.
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY
The common law doctrine of unconscionability represents a departure from the
traditional caveat emptor philosophy taken by the judicial system. In 1966, Judge
Hyman Korn of the Supreme Court of New York said that “[w]e have reached the
point where ‘Let the buyer beware’ is a poor business philosophy for a social order
allegedly based upon man’s respect for his fellow man. Let the seller beware, too!
A free enterprise system not founded upon personal morality will ultimately lose
freedom.”9 Unconscionability has been defined and explained in many paramount

4
See, e.g., Gill v. Nelnet Loan Servs. (In re Gill), 326 B.R. 611 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005)
(holding debtor's obligation for a loan taken out to finance daughter's college education was
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000) because debtor did not prove she would
be unable to maintain minimal standard of living if required to repay loan balance); Lee v.
Bank One (In re Lee), 249 B.R. 864 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000) (holding debtor did not carry his
burden of proof to avoid the lien).
5

Discover Bank, 822 N.E.2d at 871.

6

Former Cleveland Municipal Court Judge Robert J. Triozzi.

7

Countryman, supra note 3, at 17.

8

822 N.E.2d 869.

9

State v. ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321 (N.Y. Trial Term 1966); see also Nu
Dimension Figure Salons v. Becerra, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268, 273 (N.Y. Trial Term 1973) (“The
term caveat emptor has been eroded by the code. No longer can a seller hide behind it when
acting in an unconscionable manner.”).
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cases. Two such cases include Toker v. Westerman10 and Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co.11
First, in Toker, the New Jersey District Court defined an unconscionable contract
as:
[O]ne such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make
on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.
To what extent inadequacy of consideration must go to make a contract
unconscionable is difficult to state, except in abstract terms, which gives
but little practical help. It has been said that there must be an inequality
so strong, gross, and manifest that it must be impossible to state it to a
man of common sense without producing an exclamation at the inequality
of it.12
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
developed its own definition of unconscionability in Williams. The court looked to
similar cases for guidance, including those cited in the Official Comments of § 2-302
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), discussed below, such as Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motor, Inc.13 The court set forth the common law doctrine of
unconscionability in the District of Columbia and recognized it to include both an
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party and contract terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.14 The court explained that the existence of
a meaningful choice could only be determined by considering all of the
circumstances surrounding the transaction.15 Even if a meaningful choice exists in a
transaction, it could be negated by a gross inequity of bargaining power.16
10
274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. Union County 1970). In this case, a door-to-door salesman
sold a refrigerator-freezer to the purchaser under a retail installment contract for $1,229.76.
Id. The purchaser made payments for a period of time but refused to pay the balance owed,
claiming that the refrigerator was so overpriced as to make the contract unenforceable. Id.
The court found that the contract was unconscionable because the sale was for approximately
two and a half times the reasonable retail value. Id.
11
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In this case, the buyers entered into installment contracts
with the furniture company for the sale of furniture. Id. The buyers defaulted on their
payments, and the district court granted judgment in favor of the company. Id. On appeal, the
buyers contended that their contracts with the company were unenforceable due to
unconscionability. Id. The court held that it had the authority to refuse to enforce a contract
found to be unconscionable at the time it was made and reviewed the contract to consider the
contract's terms in light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of
the particular trade or case. Id. The court determined, however, that neither the trial court nor
the appellate court made findings on the possible unconscionability of the contracts, and thus,
the cases were remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Id.
12
274 A.2d at 80. The origin of the definition appears to be the case of Earl of
Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (1750). Ronald L. Hersbergen, The Improvident
Extension of Credit as an Unconscionable Contract, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 225, 290 n.271 (1974).
13

161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).

14

Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.

15

Id.

16

Id.
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Moreover, the court determined that the manner in which the contract was
entered into is an important factor for consideration.17 The court asked whether
“each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, [had] a
reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract,” or whether the terms
were “hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices.”18
The court further explained that, generally, when a party signs an agreement without
full knowledge of its terms, the party may be held to have assumed the risk of
entering a one-sided bargain.19 However, when a party has little bargaining power,
and therefore little choice, and signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little
or no knowledge of its terms, it is unlikely that the party’s consent, or even an
objective manifestation of consent, was ever really given to all of the terms.20 In
such a case, the general rule should be abandoned, and the court should consider
whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that the contract should not be
enforced.21
Finally, when determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary consideration
must be the terms of the contract in light of the circumstances existing when the
contract was made.22 The court suggested that this could be achieved by examining
the terms “in light of the general commercial background and commercial needs of a
particular trade or case.”23 The court quoted Corbin,24 who suggested that where no
meaningful choice is exercised upon entering the contract, the test should be whether
the terms are “so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and
business practices of the time and place.”25
17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id. at 449-50.

22

Id. at 450.

23

Id.

24

Arthur Linton Corbin (1874-1967) was a professor of contracts and other subjects at
Yale Law School for forty years. He authored, among other things, Corbin on Contracts, a
classic treatise which is cited by law students and judges alike. He also contributed as Special
Advisor and Reporter for the chapter on remedies of the first Restatement of Contracts.
25

Williams, 350 F.2d at 450; see also Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971). In
Kugler, the Supreme Court of New Jersey discussed unconscionability:
Unconscionability . . . is an amorphous concept obviously designed to establish a
broad business ethic. The framers of the Code naturally expected the courts to
interpret it liberally so as to effectuate the public purpose, and to pour content into it
on a case-by-case basis. In that way a substantial measure of predictability will be
achieved and professional sellers of consumer goods as well as draftsmen of contracts
for their sale to ordinary consumers will become aware of the abuses the courts have
declared unacceptable and will avoid them. The intent of the clause is not to erase the
doctrine of freedom of contract, but to make realistic the assumption of the law that
the agreement has resulted from real bargaining between parties who had freedom of
choice and understanding and ability to negotiate in a meaningful fashion.
Id. at 651-52.
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Besides being a common law defense, unconscionability is also a statutory
defense to breach of contract claims. Unconscionability, as codified in UCC § 2302, states that if the court, as a matter of law, finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or limit the application of any unconscionable clause to avoid
an unconscionable result.26 This section “permits a court to accomplish directly what
heretofore was often accompanied by construction of language, manipulations of
fluid rules of contract law and determinations based upon a presumed public
policy.”27 The basic test for unconscionability is set forth in Official Comment 1 to §
2-302: “whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so onesided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the contract.”28
While the Uniform Commercial Code forbids
unconscionable clauses in contracts, it fails to define what “unconscionable” actually
means. Courts often look to the common law definitions from such cases as Toker
and Williams, discussed above.
While § 2-302 of the UCC has been used extensively by courts to police
unconscionable agreements, it is not a consumer protection enactment.29 In order for
the UCC to apply, the agreement must involve a transaction of goods.30 Thus,
consumer loans, consumer leases, and the sale of consumer services or land are not
covered by this section.31 Another doctrine began to develop that would similarly
protect consumers but would also apply to contracts that did not involve the sale of
goods: the doctrine of improvident extension of credit.
III. THE HISTORY OF IMPROVIDENT EXTENSION OF CREDIT
While first popular in the 1960s and ‘70s, improvident extension of credit has
been a concern since the days of Plato. Plato, speaking through Socrates in the
Republic, posited that in an oligarchical state, one in which the “‘government rest[s]
on a valuation of property, in which the rich have power and the poor man is
deprived of it,’” the “greedy ‘men of business’ would acquire property [by] lending
at extravagant rates,” and the debtors would be forced to respond in revolution.32
26

U.C.C. § 2-302 (2005).

27

Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).

28

U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.

29

Hersbergen, supra note 12, at 289.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Howard, supra note 2, at 295 & n.73 (quoting PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book VIII, at
550c-550d). Plato wrote:
And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance,
men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?
Yes, often.
And still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and fully armed, . . . and
they hate and conspire against those who have got their property, and against
everybody else, and are eager for revolution.
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While those writing about improvident extension of credit in the 20th century did not
see quite as dire consequences as Plato, they shared his desire to place some of the
responsibility on the creditors.33 Beginning in the 1930s, several attempts were made
to codify the doctrine of improvident extension of credit, including the proposed
Model State Collection Act, the National Bankruptcy Conference Committee, the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and the National Commission on Consumer
Finance. Most of these attempts stemmed from the area of bankruptcy law; however,
none of these attempts were completely successful in capturing Countryman’s
original concept of improvident extension of credit.34
A. Model State Collection Act
One of the first proposals to codify improvident extension of credit came from
Professor Wesley Sturges in 1934.35 Sturges authored a Model State Collection Act
that was published in the Yale Law Journal36 but adopted nowhere.37 Sturges wrote:
“All too frequently, stable retail credit obligations, predicated upon conservative
credit extensions, are brought to default or bankruptcy because a subsequent creditgrantor indulges first in high pressure salesmanship whereby the debtor is over sold
and then in ruthless collection methods.”38 He also quoted the discussion of
That is true.
On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and pretending not
even to see those whom they have ruined, insert their sting–that is, their money–into
some one else who is not on his guard against them, and recover the parent sum many
times over multiplied into a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper
abound in the State.
Yes, he said, there are plenty of them–that is certain.
The evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it, either by restricting a
man’s use of his own property, or by another remedy:
What other?
One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to
their characters: –Let there be a general rule that every one shall enter into voluntary
contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous money-making, and
the evils of which we are speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.
Id. at 295 (quoting PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book VIII, at 555d-556b).
33

“Plato’s remedies–restricting property owners’ unbridled freedom to use their property
and placing the risks flowing from voluntary contracts on creditors–have clear, albeit
imperfect, parallels in bankruptcy law today.” Id.
34

Countryman, supra note 3, at 18.

35

Id. at 7.

36

Wesley A. Sturges, A Proposed State Collection Act, 43 YALE L.J. 1055 (1934).

37

Countryman, supra note 3, at 8. Countryman enumerated several defects with Sturges’s
proposal. Id. He first noted that the act created incentives for other creditors to bring about a
complete liquidation of the debtor’s estate when one creditor moved to collect his claim. Id.
Moreover, each general creditor was expected to have complete knowledge of the debtor’s
financial position, an unreasonable expectation. Id. Finally, any creditor with a security
interest would prevail over general creditors, regardless of when the secured creditor extended
credit. Id.
38

Wesley A. Sturges & Don E. Cooper, Credit Administration & Wage Earner
Bankruptcies, 42 YALE L.J. 487, 524 (1933).
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overloading debtors from the Thatcher Report,39 setting forth the principle that
creditors themselves are often to blame for the losses they incur because credit is
extended carelessly and without adequate inquiry or with the expectation that the
profits from the increased volume of sales will exceed the probable credit losses.40
Regardless of the credit risk, the consequences of increasing sales by encouraging
people of moderate and low income to make purchases on credit that they cannot
afford are shown in the bankruptcy statistics.41 Unfortunately, the losses from
bankruptcy are shared by all creditors equally.42 The Thatcher Report also provided
an illustration of this principle:
The situation is well illustrated in the case of wage earners who, in large
numbers, seek discharge from their debts in bankruptcy because they have
been induced by one group of creditors at the expense of another to buy
luxuries they cannot afford. These debtors either because of the more
active collection methods of dealers in luxuries or in order to retain
property sold to them under conditional sales contracts, often satisfy their
debts owing for luxuries and seek discharge in bankruptcy from debts
owing to the butcher, the baker, the grocer and the doctor, who had no
part in bringing about their insolvency.43
As part of the proposed act, unsecured contractual creditors would be entitled to
priority payment from a debtor’s estate in the order in which they extended credit.44
Furthermore, when one creditor brought an action to collect his claim, other creditors
could join in the same action and assert their priorities.45 From the Model State
Collection Act, it is apparent that a solution to the problem of improvident extension
of credit, while not termed such, has been sought for many decades.
B. National Bankruptcy Conference Committee
“In 1965, the National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC)46 created a special
committee, [chaired by Vern Countryman,] to propose improvements in wage earner
39
In 1929, as a consequence of a number of grand jury indictments for bankruptcy frauds,
District Judge Thomas D. Thacher conducted an investigation of over 4000 witnesses, creating
the “Donovan Report,” named after the counsel for the bar associations that participated in the
investigation. Countryman, supra note 3, at 6 n.28. Thacher became Soliciter General of the
United States and directed a nationwide survey by the Department of Justice to produce the
“Thacher Report.” Id.
40
Id. (citing STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, S. DOC. NO. 72-65
(1st Sess. 1932)).
41

Id. at 6-7.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 7.

44

Sturges, supra note 36, at 1080.

45

Id. at 1076.

46

The National Bankruptcy Conference is a voluntary, non-profit, self-supporting
organization of about 65 lawyers, law teachers, and bankruptcy judges who have achieved
scholarly distinction in the field of bankruptcy law. National Bankruptcy Conference,
www.nationalbankruptcyconference.org/mission.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2005). The
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proceedings under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act.”47 The committee
recommended a proposed bill that would have added, among other things, two new
provisions to Chapter XIII:
(1) On application of the debtor and after hearing on notice to the creditor
concerned, the court might determine that a claim, secured or unsecured,
was unconscionable or contained unconscionable terms, and might
disallow such claim and order it excluded from the wage earner plan, or
allow the claim without the unconscionable terms, or so limit the claim as
to avoid any unconscionable result. . . .48
(2) On application of the debtor and after hearing on notice to the creditor
concerned, the court might determine that a claim, secured or unsecured,
was based on “an improvident extension of credit in view of the
information reasonably available to the creditor at the time of extending
credit, and such claim may then be separately provided for in the plan, or
may be excluded from the plan, and if excluded from the plan shall not be
deemed dealt with by the plan.”49
The NBC approved the proposal on unconscionability, but not the improvident
credit extension provision.50

purpose of the Conference is to study bankruptcy laws and draft proposals for their reform. Id.
The organization was formed in the 1940s by leading scholars who assisted Congress in
drafting the Chandler Act of 1938, the first comprehensive revision of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898. Id. Since its formation, the Conference has monitored the operation and practice of
bankruptcy law and has consulted with Congress in every substantial amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act up to the 1970s. Id.
47

Countryman, supra note 3, at 8. The proposed improvements were to be an alternative
to a bill, H.R. 292, 89th Cong. (1965) (1st Sess.), sponsored by the American Bar Association
Consumer Bankruptcy Committee, providing for compulsory Chapter XIII proceedings.
Countryman, supra note 3, at 8.
48

Countryman, supra note 3, at 8-9. The first proposal went on to explain:
This proposal was modeled on § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) but
that section is confined in its application to “transactions in goods.” While the concept
of unconscionability did not originate with the UCC, and has been employed by courts
to test personal service contracts and loan agreements, judicial development of the
concept had been spotty and the intent of the proposal was to give the Chapter XIII
court a clear statutory base for testing any claim for unconscionability regardless of
development of state law on the subject.
Id. at 9.
49

Id. The second proposal explained that “[t]his proposal, unlike the one dealing with
unconscionability had no precedent in case law or statute.” Id.
50
Id. at 9-10. Countryman explained that the proposal on improvident credit extension
was flawed for two reasons. Id. at 10. First, there was no reason for confining it to Chapter
XIII cases. Id. Second, it was unclear whether an improvident claim excluded from the plan
would be covered by the bankruptcy discharge because a discharge in a Chapter XIII case
applies only to debts provided for in the plan. Id.
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C. Uniform Consumer Credit Code
In 1968, the American Bar Association’s National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC).51
Section 5.108 extended the unconscionability “provisions of UCC § 2-302 to any
consumer credit sale, consumer lease, or consumer loan.”52 Similar to the UCC, the
UCCC does not define the term unconscionable; however, it does list five factors for
consideration.53 The first factor encompasses the idea of improvident extension of
credit: “‘belief by the creditor at the time consumer credit sales, consumer leases, or
consumer loans are made that there was no reasonable probability of payment in full
of the obligation by the debtor.’”54 The UCCC was only adopted in twelve states,
and much of it became preempted or unnecessary by the federal Truth in Lending
Act.55
D. National Commission on Consumer Finance
At the beginning of the 1970s, the National Commission on Consumer Finance
(NCCF) conducted an inquiry into the concept of improvident extension of credit.56
Vern Countryman was questioned by the Commission’s counsel and provided them
with a general standard.57 He felt that when a bankruptcy court considers whether a
consumer credit transaction is unconscionable, in addition to the law, it should
consider whether the transaction entailed an improvident extension of credit.58 The
court should determine whether the creditor made an extension of credit to a debtor
where it cannot reasonably be expected that the debtor can repay the debt in full, in
view of the circumstances of the debtor as known to the creditor and of such
circumstances as would have been revealed to him upon reasonable inquiry prior to
the credit extension.59 The Commission adopted Countryman’s standard test but
submitted no proposed legislation.60 Instead, the Commission endorsed the idea,

51

Id. at 10.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id. (quoting UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 6.111(3)(a) (1969 Revised Final
Draft)). Similar to the UCCC, The National Consumer Act of 1970, drafted by the National
Consumer Law Center, provides for nonenforcement of unconscionable consumer credit
transactions and contains a longer list of factors to be taken into consideration. Id. at 11.
However, the National Consumer Act never addresses improvident extension of credit. Id.
55

Jean Braucher, Deadlock: Consumer Transactions Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 83, 115 (1999).
56

Countryman, supra note 3, at 12.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 13.

59

Id. at 13-14.

60

Id. at 13.
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previously seen in the UCCC, that improvident extension of credit should be treated
as a piece of unconscionability.61
E. Vern Countryman’s Proposal
Vern Countryman recognized that it takes two offending parties to complete an
improvident transaction.62 However, he believed that creditors are in a better
position to avoid and distribute the risk of loss of improvidence due to education,
experience, resources, and the nature of their role.63 To place the risk of loss on the
improvident creditor, a remedy must be conferred on the improvident debtor.64
Countryman posited that improvident extension of credit should be available to
debtors to be used as both a defense and as a basis for affirmative relief.65
According to Countryman, debtors should be permitted to assert improvident
extension of credit as a defense in bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy cases.66 The
defense should apply only to the part of the claim recognized as being improvident,
not to the entire claim.67 When timely asserted by debtors, the defense would
provide a remedy for not only debtors, but their other creditors as well.68
There are some instances when relieving debtors of their obligation to repay
improvident credit extensions will not remedy the damage done to debtors or to their
other creditors.69 Due to the improvident debt, debtors “may have fallen into arrears
on . . . other debts,” or may have been unable to provide for their families.70 For this
61

Id. Countryman also prepared and submitted a paper to the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. Id. at 14. The paper addressed both improvident and
unconscionable credit extension and suggested that both concepts should be uniformly
incorporated in the bankruptcy law through amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. Id. In 1973,
the Commission filed a report and revised the Bankruptcy Act of 1973. Id. Section 4403(b)(8) of the Act provided for the disallowance of a consumer debt that was
unconscionable. Id. at 15. Section 4-403(c) set forth three factors to be considered in
determining unconscionability. Id. To Countryman’s dismay, none of the factors focused on
improvident extension of credit. Id. The third factor, however, incorporated nonbankruptcy
law on the subject by authorizing the consideration of “definitions of unconscionability in
statutes, regulations, rulings, and decisions of State and federal legislative, administrative, and
judicial bodies.” Id.; see also Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases,
47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 631 (1972).
62

Countryman, supra note 3, at 17. Countryman wrote: “[A]s with the Tango it takes two
to be improvident–any credit extension which is improvident on the part of the creditor is
equally improvident on the part of the debtor.” Id.
63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 18, 20.

66

Id. at 18. The defense must be applied to nonbankruptcy law because not all
improvident debtors resort to bankruptcy. Id. Further, any defense recognized in other areas
of the law is applicable in bankruptcy. Id.
67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 20.

70

Id.
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reason, Countryman believed that debtors and their other creditors should be able to
recover, from the improvident creditor, any damages that they can prove.71 Whether
as a defense or a basis for affirmative relief, Countryman believed strongly that
improvident extension of credit should not remain mere common law, but must be
recognized through legislation.72
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF IMPROVIDENT EXTENSION OF CREDIT
Vern Countryman was never able to see improvident extension of credit codified
during his lifetime.73 To date, the UCCC is the most successful codification that has
been achieved in the area of improvident extension of credit.74 The proposals for
codification slowed after the 1970s, and no solution was ever reached, although
many scholars still shared Countryman’s concerns.75 However, in the 1980s, the
financial services market began to change with the securitization of loans76 and the
repeal of usury laws,77 and improvident extension of credit lessened as a concern.
A. Market Securitization
Securitization changed the financial services market because it allowed more
capital to be generated while reducing risks and costs through diversification.78
Securitization of both government sponsored entities and the private sector began in
the 1980s.79 Securitization is a multi-step process used to convert packages of loans
into securities that are backed by collateral.80 First, lenders make loans to
borrowers.81 The loans are then bundled and transferred to a special-purpose vehicle
71

Id.

72

Id. at 21.

73

Countryman died at the age of 81 on May 2, 1999. HLS’ Vern Countryman Dies, supra
note 2.
74

Howard, supra note 2, at 297.

75

Elizabeth Warren, Countryman’s successor at Harvard Law School, and coauthors
Teresa Sullivan and Jay Westbrook have written two books that address improvident extension
of credit indirectly by describing the role that lenders play in the bankruptcies of their debtors.
In the first book, the authors posit that creditors could reduce bankruptcy losses by gathering
more complete information about prospective borrowers. TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989). The
second book, which focuses on credit card issuers, discusses how lending practices help create
the financial jeopardy that leads to bankruptcy. TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000).
76
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1273 (2002).
77

Jorge Amador, Are Credit Interest Rates Too High?, THE FREEMAN (Jan. 1988),
available at www.libertyhaven.com/theoreticalorphilosophicalissues/economics/financial
markets/creditcard.html.
78

Engel, supra note 76, at 1274.

79

Id. at 1273.

80

Id. at 1274.

81

Id.
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that reduces the risk of default associated with the loans by adding credit
enhancements.82 The special-purpose vehicle creates, issues, and then sells the
securities to investors.83 The special-purpose vehicle may collect loan payments and
distribute the proceeds, or the seller of the loan may retain these rights.84
Securitization eliminates the liquidity restraints suffered by banks and lenders and
also allows more funds to be available to lend by creating a constant flow of money
into the market.85 Moreover, securitization allows more entities to join the financial
services market. With securitization, lenders do not have to be large, highly
capitalized financial institutions.86
B. The Repeal of Usury Laws and the Impact of Marquette National Bank of
Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.87
1. The History of the Credit Card Industry
To analyze the effect of the repeal of usury laws on improvident extension of
credit, it is helpful to examine the history of the credit card industry. Charge cards,
the predecessors to the modern credit card, were established by Western Union and
various department stores, hotels, and oil companies around 1914.88 Early charge
cards could be used to purchase the issuers’ goods and services only, and balances
had to be paid monthly.89 The first general purpose card was introduced in 1950 by
Diners Club and allowed customers to use the card at a variety of establishments.90
In 1958, American Express issued a similar card.91 The transformation from charge
card to credit card occurred when banks entered the industry, issuing general purpose
credit cards that allowed balances to be carried from month to month unlike the
charge card.92
Bank of America issued the nation’s first general purpose credit card in 1958
when it mass-mailed sixty thousand credit cards to the residents of Fresno,
California.93 The bank hoped to attract customers with a new revolving credit line

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

439 U.S. 299 (1978).

88

David A. Lander, “It ‘is’ the Best of Times, It ‘is’ the Worst of Times”: A Short Essay on
Consumer Bankruptcy After the Revolution, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 204 (2004).
89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Frontline: The Secret History of the Credit Card (PBS television broadcast Nov. 23,
2004), available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit [hereinafter PBS Show].
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and to tap into the “pent-up consumer demands of World War II baby boomers.”94
Many banks followed the example of Bank of America and began soliciting the
masses with open-ended lines of credit.95 However, the concept of far-off banks
extending unlimited credit did not catch on immediately.96 In fact, growth in the
industry stalled for over a decade because most merchants only accepted credit cards
issued by local banks.97
Again showing its innovation in the industry, Bank of America introduced the
modern credit card in 1966 when it began licensing the BankAmericard credit card
logo to other banks, providing the infrastructure for a national system to process
credit card transactions.98 The group of participating banks is known today as Visa.99
Another similar group of banks formed the MasterCard association.100 While Visa
and MasterCard were able to convince merchants nationwide to accept their cards,
problems for the credit card industry were just beginning.101
The next stumbling block for the industry came just before Christmas in 1966
and was termed “The Chicago Debacle.”102 A group of Midwestern banks massmailed five million credit cards to reach the market of Chicago holiday shoppers.103
Cards were mailed to convicted felons, children, and even family pets.104 There was
an uproar among consumers, and the nightly news reported incidents of corrupt
postal workers stealing cards for organized crime rings.105 Consumers were being
billed for thousands of dollars of charges on credit cards that they had never
received.106 Congress held hearings after some consumers called for credit cards to
be banned completely.107 Eventually, the waters calmed for the surviving issuing
banks, but not for long.
Another problem for the credit card industry came in the form of state usury
laws. Originally developed in the colonial period, states established usury laws to
94

Id. “‘What is this with people wanting credit?’ ” Walter Wriston, the chairman of
Citibank, recalled being asked by his boss. Id. “And I said, ‘Look, we just put five years of
our life in a brown suit carrying an M1 riffle, and we want the refrigerator now.’” Id.
95

Id.

96

Id. Wriston explained in an interview that his hometown of 30,000 people had one bank,
and “the old guy with a green eyeshade gave you credit or he didn’t.” Id.
97

Lander, supra note 88, at 204.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

PBS Show, supra note 93.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.
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cap interest rates.108 In the 1970s, inflation rates were high, and credit card
companies were being squeezed between the interest rates that they could charge
under the state usury laws and the high interest rates that they had to pay due to
inflation.109 Companies were lending money at rates much lower than they were
paying out.110
2. Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.
In 1978, a solution came for credit card companies in the form of a Supreme
Court opinion; the Court changed the interpretation of usury laws in Marquette
National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.111 In this case, the
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis (“Marquette”), a Minnesota-chartered
national banking association enrolled in the BankAmericard plan, brought an action
to enjoin the operation of the First National Bank of Omaha (“Omaha”), a Nebraskachartered national banking association also enrolled in the BankAmericard plan, until
Omaha complied with the Minnesota usury laws.112 Omaha solicited customers in
Minnesota, among other states, and charged cardholders the interest rate mandated
by Nebraska usury laws, a higher interest rate than permitted by Minnesota usury
laws.113 Marquette claimed to be losing customers to Omaha due to the low interest
rate that they were forced to follow.114 The Solicitor General of Minnesota joined the
lawsuit, arguing that the exportation of Nebraska’s interest rate would make it
difficult for states to enact effective usury laws.115
The Supreme Court held that § 85 of the National Bank Act of 1864116 allowed
Omaha to charge its Minnesota customers a higher interest rate than that sanctioned
108
Amador, supra note 77. States had the power to establish their own usury rates so they
often varied from state to state. Id. In the 1950s, one state had a rate of 4%, five states had a
rate of 5%, forty states had a rate of 6%, and four states had a rate of 7%. Id. (quoting SIDNEY
HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 401 (1977)).
109

PBS Show, supra note 93.

110

Id. Walter Wriston from Citibank explained that “[y]ou are lending money at 12% and
paying 20%. Id. You don’t have to be Einstein to realize you’re out of business.” Id.
111

439 U.S. at 299.

112

Id. at 301.

113

Id. at 302. Nebraska law permited Omaha to charge an interest rate of 18% per year on
the first $999.99 and 12% per year on amounts of $1,000 and more. Id. Minnesota law fixed
the permitted annual interest rate at 12%. Id.
114

Id. at 304.

115

Id. at 316, 318-19.

116

12 USC § 85 (2000). Section 85 of the Act, titled “Rate of interest on loans, discounts
and purchases,” states:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made,
or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate
allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at
a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper
in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is
located, whichever may be the greater, and no more, except that where by the laws of
any State a different rate is limited for banks organized under State laws, the rate so
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by Minnesota law.117 The Court reasoned that Omaha could not be deprived of its
Nebraska location merely because the BankAmericard program extended credit to
residents of other states; Nebraska was the state from which credit was extended,
unpaid balance finance charges were assessed, payments were received, and credit
cards were issued.118 Further, the statutory location of the bank did not change just
because the credit cards could be used to purchase goods and services outside of
Nebraska.119 However, the Court agreed with the Solicitor General of Minnesota that
the exportation of interest rates may impair the ability of states to maintain effective
usury laws but indicated that this problem was always a part of the National Bank
Act and that any correction should be achieved legislatively.120
The Marquette decision applied to all types of consumer loans but had its greatest
impact on the credit card industry.121 Due to the ability of credit card lending to be
accomplished completely by mail, credit card companies could move their
headquarters to the states with the most liberal usury laws.122 Citibank was the first
bank to seize the opportunity presented by the Marquette decision.123 By 1980,
Citibank, incorporated in New York, had lost more than one billion dollars because
the inflation rate exceeded the amount of interest that the company could charge its
credit card customers under the New York usury laws.124 Walter Wriston, the
limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in any such State under
this title. When no rate is fixed by the laws of the State, or Territory, or District, the
bank may take, receive, reserve, or charge a rate not exceeding 7 per centum, or 1 per
centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the
Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is located,
whichever may be the greater, and such interest may be taken in advance, reckoning
the days for which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt has to run. The maximum
amount of interest or discount to be charged at a branch of an association located
outside of the States of the United States and the District of Columbia shall be at the
rate allowed by the laws of the county, territory, dependency, province, dominion,
insular possession, or other political subdivision where the branch is located. And the
purchase, discount, or sale of a bona fide bill of exchange, payable at another place
than the place of such purchase, discount, or sale, at not more than the current rate of
exchange for sight-drafts in addition to the interest, shall not be considered as taking
or receiving a greater rate of interest.
Id.
117
Marquette, 439 U.S. at 307-19. The District Court entered partial summary judgment
for Marquette, holding that the Minnesota usury law was not preempted by § 85 of the
National Bank Act. Id. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed, holding that Nebraska
usury laws governed the operation of the Nebraska national bank’s credit card program. Id.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Id. at 306.
118

Id. at 310-12.

119

Id. at 312-13.

120

Id. at 318-19.

121

Lander, supra note 88, at 214.

122

Id.

123

PBS Show, supra note 93.

124

Id.
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chairman of Citibank, attempted to convince New York legislators to raise the usury
rates or to eliminate them all together, but the legislators refused.125 At the same
time, South Dakota was considering eliminating its usury laws in an attempt to
stimulate the local economy.126 Wriston contacted Bill Janklow, the governor of
South Dakota, to make a deal.127 He proposed that if South Dakota would quickly
pass legislation that would enable Citibank to move its credit card operations to the
state, the bank would bring four hundred high-paying, white-collar jobs.128 Other
banks began to follow the lead of Citibank and move to South Dakota.129 Other
states caught on as well; Delaware passed similar legislation the following year, and
many other states loosened their usury laws.130
During the years prior to the Marquette decision when credit card companies
were losing billions of dollars, some consumers also paid the price for state usury
laws.131 Eligibility standards for new applicants became more stringent, and some
banks refused new accounts altogether.132 Moreover, millions of delinquent accounts
were discontinued.133 Once states began to change interest rates, profits soared for
the credit card industry, and consumers could easily obtain credit cards.134 Between
1980 and 1990, the number of credit cards more than doubled, and the average
household credit card balance rose from $518 to $2,700.135 With their new profits
and power, credit card companies were given more freedom while consumer
protections, such as improvident extension of credit, began to relax.136

125

Id. In an interview, Wriston said that he told New York’s political leaders that they
only had to raise the usury ceiling a reasonable amount, and Citibank would stay in the state.
Id. Legislators did not believe that the company would actually relocate, so they did not
reconsider the interest rates. Id.
126

Id. Bill Janklow, the former governor of South Dakota, said that “[the state] was in the
poor house. It cost 42 cents to a bushel in 1980 to haul wheat. Id. When something’s only
selling for $2.20 a bushel, you certainly can’t afford to be paying almost 50 cents a bushel to
ship it.” Id.
127

Id.

128

Id. Wriston also agreed that Citibank would be a limited bank, as not to create
competition for existing local banks. Id. Wriston told Janklow, “We’ll put the facility in an
inconvenient place for customers and we’ll pay different interest rates. All we want to do is
use it to issue cards.” Id. As for the legislation, it was actually drafted by Citibank, and it was
introduced and passed by the legislature in one day. Id.
129

Id. Ultimately, 3000 new high-paying jobs were brought to South Dakota. Id.

130

Id.

131

Amador, supra note 77.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

PBS Show, supra note 93.

135

Id.

136

Id.
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V. A GREATER NEED FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION
A. New Tools for the Industry
1. Annual Fees
Following the explosion of credit cards after the elimination of state usury laws,
the credit card industry continued to evolve and began to find new ways to take
advantage of consumers. In 1980, the annual fee was introduced without much
protest from cardholders.137 President Carter attempted to slow inflation by imposing
a freeze on soliciting new credit card accounts.138 The freeze only lasted a few
months, but it was long enough to introduce the twenty dollar annual fee to
counteract “transactors,” the unprofitable customers who paid off their balances
each month.139 The annual fee allowed these customers to be profitable as well.140
For ten years, the industry profited from the annual fee, but AT&T began offering a
credit card with no annual fee in 1990.141 The response from consumers was
enormous, and some competitors also eliminated their annual fees.142 But the days of
the straight forward interest rates and mass-marketed credit cards were numbered.143
2. Complex Contract Terms
Credit cards became complex financial arrangements for customers.144 The terms
and rates were often changed by the credit card companies and were too complex to
be understood by the cardholders.145 Like the addition of annual fees, the change
followed an action by the President of the United States.146 On November 12, 1991,
President George Bush announced that the economy and consumer confidence could
be stimulated by lowering credit card rates.147 The Senate introduced a national cap

137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142
Id. AT&T received 260,000 phone calls from interested consumers on the first day that
the no annual fee credit card was introduced. Id.
143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Id. The announcement occurred at a $1,000-a-plate fundraising luncheon for President
Bush in New York. Id. An aide made a last minute addition to the President’s speech. Id.
The President announced, “I’d frankly like to see credit cards [sic] rates down. I believe that
would help stimulate the consumer and get consumer confidence moving again.” Id. With
two sentences, credit cards were forever changed. Id.
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to credit card interest rates equaling 14% the very next day.148 After only thirty
minutes of debate, the Senate approved the bill by a vote of 74-19.149 By the week’s
end, the credit card industry was in a panic, and the stock market plunged.150 The
concept of a national credit card rate cap died out, but the industry refers to the
incident as “the Big Scare.”151 Following “the Big Scare,” the credit card industry
decided that it was time to reevaluate its pricing practices.152
3. Higher Credit Lines and Penalty Fees
The industry began searching for more profitable pricing methods, and Andrew
S. Kahr153 was one of the first in the industry to discover that it was possible to
analyze customer financial data with complex formulas and scoring systems to
predict which customers were profitable “revolvers,” those least likely to pay off
their credit card balances each month.154 Kahr also determined that higher credit
lines were both attractive to customers and highly profitable for credit card
companies.155 Companies could raise credit lines by decreasing the required
minimum payment.156 Heightened credit lines increased profits for credit card
companies in two ways.157 First, each dollar of principal would generate more
interest because it would take longer to pay off balances.158 Second, the principal
itself would increase because cardholders could take on more debt and make the
same minimum monthly payments.159 Critics say that the lower minimum payment
percentage shrouds the true cost of debt and keeps consumers dangerously
leveraged.160 In addition, the credit card companies implemented penalty fees to

148
Id. The following day, after the President’s speech, Senator Alfonse M. D’Amato
introduced the bill. Id. The Senator, representing the state of New York, had attended the
luncheon. Id.
149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id.

153

Id. Kahr was a child prodigy who earned a Ph.D. in mathematics from MIT when he
was twenty years old. Id. He became a financial industry consultant and founded a credit card
company in 1984 that would become Providian, one of the top ten credit card issuers. Id.
154

Id.

155

Id.

156

Id. For example, if minimum payments were cut from 5% to 2%, a company could
increase a credit line from $2,000 to $5,000 and still charge the same $100 minimum payment.
Id. Today, 2% is the standard minimum payment and the average household credit card debt
has tripled since 1990. Id.
157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Id.

160

Id.
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raise profits. Penalty fees raise billions of dollars in revenue each year.161 Because
most consumers do not anticipate that they will make late payments, they fail to shop
around for better late fees.162 However, most consumers are late at one point or
another.163
B. The Legality of Penalty Fees and Smiley v. Citibank164
As with interest rates in the Marquette case, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of penalty fees in Smiley v. Citibank. 165 Like Marquette, the Smiley decision
rested on the interpretation of § 85 of the National Bank Act.166 Barbara Smiley, a
resident of California and Citibank cardholder, brought a class-action suit against
Citibank, a South Dakota corporation, on behalf of herself and other California
cardholders.167 Smiley alleged that the penalty fees168 permitted under South Dakota
law violated statutory and common law of California.169 Relying on the Marquette
decision, the Supreme Court held that § 85 of the National Bank Act permitted a
national bank to charge its loan customers interest at the rate allowed by the laws of
the state in which the bank is located.170
Smiley also challenged the definition of interest.171 The Court deferred to the
definition provided by the Comptroller of the Currency.172 The Comptroller said that
161

Id.

162

Id.

163

Id. The average prime consumer incurs one late fee a year. Id. The average sub-prime
consumer incurs two and a half late fees per year. Id.
164

517 U.S. 735 (1996).

165

Id.

166

Id. at 737.

167

Id. at 738.

168

Id. Petitioner held two credit cards from Citibank, a Classic Card and a Preferred Card.
Id. The Classic Card agreement allowed Citibank to charge a late fee of $15 for each monthly
period in which the cardholder failed to make the minimum monthly payment within twentyfive days of the due date. Id. The Preferred Card agreement permitted Citibank to charge a
late fee of $6 if the minimum payment was not received within fifteen days of the due date and
an additional fee of $15 or 0.65% of the outstanding balance, whichever is greater, if the
minimum payment was not received by the next minimum monthly payment due date. Id.
169

Id. Smiley alleged the following common law violations: breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and breach
of contract. Id. She alleged the following statutory claims: CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ANN. §
17200 (West Supp. 1996) (prohibiting unlawful business practices) and CAL. CIV. CODE ANN.
§ 1671 (West 1985) (invalidating unreasonable liquidated damages). Smiley, 517 U.S. at 738
n.1.
170

Id. at 737.

171

Id. at 740.

172

Id. The Court deferred to the Comptroller of the Currency because it is the practice of
the Court to defer to reasonable judgments of agencies in regard to the meaning of ambiguous
terms in statutes that they administer. Id. at 739 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with
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the term “interest,” as used in the National Bank Act, includes any payment of
compensation to a creditor or prospective creditor for an extension of credit, any
making available of a line of credit, or any default or breach by a borrower of a
condition upon which credit was extended, such as numerical periodic rates, late
fees, not sufficient funds (NSF) fees, over-limit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees,
and membership fees.173 However, the term does not ordinarily include appraisal
fees, premiums, and commissions attributable to insurance guaranteeing repayment
of any extension of credit, finders’ fees, fees for document preparation or
notarization, or fees incurred to obtain credit reports.174 Ultimately, the Court
validated the penalty fees charged to cardholders and decided that Citibank could
charge penalty fees at any rate permitted by the laws of the state in which it is
located.175
The Smiley decision hurt consumers. Even Duncan A. MacDonald, the former
general counsel of Citibank’s credit card division who spearheaded the case, has
admitted that penalty fees are out of control and that they are unfair to consumers.176
MacDonald said that at the time of the Smiley decision, the company’s attorneys felt
that they were working for a good cause—free-market pricing.177 Late fees were
common and ranged from $5 to $15 before the Supreme Court decision, but after the
decision, late fees soared to almost $40.178 MacDonald was quoted as saying, “I
certainly didn’t imagine that someday we might’ve ended up creating
Frankenstein.”179 Mr. Kahr, on the other hand, argues that the market will decide
what is fair for consumers.180
VI. INADEQUATE SOLUTIONS
Many people feel that solutions to the problem of improvident extension of credit
already exist in the form of market self-regulation, educational programs, and the
unconscionability doctrine. However, these solutions do not adequately protect
consumers from being exploited by improvident creditors.

the enforcement of banking laws. Id. (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995)).
173

Id. at 739-40.

174

Id. at 740.

175

Id. at 735.

176

PBS Show, supra note 93. MacDonald said, “Millions and millions of people are being
excessively charged late fees and bad-check fees and over-the-limit fees and then these 25%
APRs to make profits for the industry, so that they can keep the rates lower for people who are
rate sensitive, who can in fact, shop the system.” Id.
177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Id.

180

Id. Kahr said that, “[i]f someone is riskier, he should be paying a higher rate. It’s more
economically sound. It’s fairer for riskier people to pay a higher interest rate, higher fees,
whatever it is, than less risky people.” Id.
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A. Market Self-Regulation
Some economists believe that the market will correct its own problems through
market competition and lower interest rates.181 Several banks have already
voluntarily lowered their interest rates.182 For example, American Express created
the Optima credit card with a 13.5% interest rate.183 American Express claims that
the market is working and “will and does respond to consumer dissatisfaction by
reducing interest rates.”184 Financial newspapers around the country have applauded
American Express for their actions.185 However, the Optima card is not available for
everyone—only those consumers who already hold American Express cards can
apply for Optima cards.186 Plus, there is an additional $15 fee on top of the $45
annual charge.187 Applicants must also meet more stringent requirements for the
lower rate card; the card is only offered to those viewed as safe credit risks with solid
credit histories who have been American Express members for over a year.188 The
new low rate credit cards have provided no protection for the low income
cardholders who are typically the victims of improvident extension of credit.189 Nor
have the lower rate cards created a credit card war as predicted by economists.190
Instead, the lower rate credit cards have created a segmentation in the market.191
Lower credit risks can borrow at lower rates, and higher risk consumers must borrow
at higher rates, further disservicing those who need the most protection.192

181

Amador, supra note 77.

182

Id. Besides American Express, Citicorp has also cut rates for preferred customers. Id.
Most cardholders have an interest rate of 19.8%, while preferred customers have a rate of
16.8%. Id. Similarly, Wells Fargo decreased rates from 20% to 17% for customers who had a
Wells Fargo card for at least five years. Id.
183

Id.

184

Id.

185

Id. The Wall Street Journal stated that “[t]he greater consumer sensitivity to interest
rates no doubt figured into Amex’s plans to take a plunge into the business with a lower-rate
card . . . . Credit card interest almost certainly will come down. It will come down without
rate ceilings. Nothing does it like competition.’” Id. (quoting Editorial, Pressure on Plastic,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1987, at 22.). This has been termed the Credit Card War. Id.
186

Id.

187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Id.

191

Id. Fortune predicted that the market would see “small interest rate reductions on
premium cards—those offering larger credit lines and requiring better credit histories.” Id.
192

Id.
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B. Credit Counseling and Educational Programs
Credit counseling and financial education programs are also suggested solutions
to the problem of improvident extension of credit.193 These programs have been
around for thirty years and have “helped” millions of people.194 The programs
purport to teach consumers to save money and to create a reserve for emergencies.195
However, the success of these programs is questionable at best.196 Low quality
providers impose excessive charges and provide poor services.197 Higher quality
organizations do provide an education on finances and credit.198 It is easy to teach
someone that saving is important; however, it is difficult, if not impossible, for
consumers with little disposable income to save money when they can barely provide
for their families. Moreover, the success of these programs is often measured by the
number of people not filing a bankruptcy petition within a specified period of time
after a counseling session.199 To measure the value of these programs, the success
must be evaluated over a long-term period of time or by another method of
assessment.200
C. Unconscionability
Unconscionability, while possibly encompassing the idea of improvident
extension of credit, is also an inadequate solution. To become an adequate solution,
courts must extend unconscionability a step further to improvident extension of
credit. Because unconscionability has no formal definition, courts apply this
doctrine in different ways. As previously discussed in Part II, many courts look at
the bargaining position of the parties and an absence of meaningful choice.201
Improvident credit agreements may satisfy this definition, but unconscionability does
not take into consideration the knowledge of the debtors’ financial position and their
inability to pay. As developed for consumer protection, unconscionability is difficult
and costly to invoke because it requires a lawyer’s expertise and, therefore, is not
readily available to consumers. Furthermore, statutory unconscionability as defined
by the UCC only applies to transactions of goods; thus, credit card transactions lie
outside of its scope.202

193

Lander, supra note 88, at 211.

194

Id.

195

Id. at 212.

196

Id.

197

Id. at 217.

198

Id. at 211.

199

Id. at 212.

200

Id.

201

See, e.g., Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. Union County 1970);
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
202

U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004).
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VII. A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: DISCOVER BANK V. OWENS
In 2003, one municipal court judge stood up for an impoverished woman against
a giant in the credit card industry.203
A. Facts
Ruth M. Owens was one of several thousand Clevelanders each year who become
the subjects of credit card collection suits as a result of ballooning credit card debt.204
Debtors cite many reasons for being overwhelmed by the accumulated credit card
debt: disability, declining real wages, job displacement, and rising health care
costs.205 Owens was no exception.206
Discover Bank (“Discover”), a lender and issuer of credit cards, filed a breach of
contract claim against Owens, a Discover Card holder, for failure to make the
minimum monthly payments required under the cardholder agreement.207 Discover
claimed that Owens owed a balance of $5,564.28.208 In response to the plaintiff’s
complaint, Owens filed a handwritten answer on her own behalf, stating:
I would like to inform you that I have no money to make payments. I am
on Social Security Disability. After paying my monthly utilities, there is
no money left except little food money and sometimes it isn’t enough. If
my situation was different I would pay. I just don’t have it. I’m sorry.209
At trial, Discover provided the court with a copy of Owens’ Cardmember
Agreement, which outlined the minimum monthly payment requirement, the periodic
finance charges, and the various fees that were applicable, as well as a copy of
Owens’ monthly statements from January 1996 to May 2003.210 The statements
showed that Owens had a credit limit of $1,900 and had stopped using the card in
March of 1997 before she exceeded her limit.211 Owens asserted that she had made
her best effort to pay under her financial circumstances and had in fact made many
payments, totaling $3,492, over the six years that followed.212 Due to miscellaneous
fees and finance charges, Owens had paid $3,492 on a debt of $1,900, yet still
carried a balance of $5,564.28.213
203

Discover Bank v. Owens, 822 N.E.2d 869 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Clev. 2004).

204

Id. at 871.

205

Id.

206

Id.

207

Id.

208

Id.

209

Id.

210

Id.

211

Id. at 872.

212

Id.

213

Id. Along with late fees and over-limit fees, Owens was charged monthly for a
Discover card product called CreditSafe Plus which would suspend her payments and finance
charges without affecting her credit rating if she became unemployed, hospitalized, or
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Judge Triozzi questioned how something like this could happen and noted that if
Owens had stopped paying on her account in 1997, as an “unscrupulous person” may
have done, her account would have been closed.214 Discover would have filed an
action seven years earlier for an amount not in excess of $2,000.215 Discover may
even have agreed to negotiate a settlement at a fraction of the amount due, as credit
card companies often do.216 However, Owens was “not unscrupulous,” and she tried
to repay her debt on her meager Social Security Disability income until she realized
that “it was a debt out from under which she could never climb.”217 The court
acknowledged the “widespread financial exploitation of the urban poor by
overbearing credit card companies” and found in favor of Ruth Owens.218
B. Court’s Rationale
The court relied on the notion of equity to decide this case. “The function of
equity is to supplement the law where it is insufficient, moderating the unjust results
that would follow from the unbending application of the law.”219 The court
determined that Owens had no remedy at law; thus, the court’s use of its equitable
jurisdiction was both proper and necessary.220 No remedy exists at law because, as
previously discussed, improvident extension of credit has ever been codified.
In the opinion, Judge Triozzi discussed several doctrines in equity while
balancing the responsibility of each party.221 Together, these doctrines closely
resemble the theory of improvident extension of credit.222 The court first discussed
Owens’s own responsibility for her situation; no one forced her to open the credit
card, nor did they force her to use it.223 Moreover, she could have sought legal or
financial counsel several years earlier to determine the best option for her.224 Instead,
Owens decided to continue trying to pay her debt; “[w]hile clearly placing her on
the moral high road, that same highway unfortunately was her road to financial

disabled. Id. Judge Triozzi presumed that since Owens was already on Social Security
Disability and was already unemployed, CreditSafe Plus only pertained to the possibility of
Owens becoming hospitalized. Id. at 871.
214

Id. at 872.

215

Id.

216

Id.

217

Id. at 872-73.

218

Id. at 875.

219

Id. at 874. (citing Salem Iron Co. v. Hyland, 77 N.E.751 (Ohio 1906)).

220
Id. The Cleveland Municipal Court has the authority “to hear and determine all legal
and equitable remedies necessary or proper for a complete determination of the rights of the
parties.” Id.
221

Id. at 873-74.

222

Id. at 873.

223

Id.

224

Id.
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ruin.”225 The court stated that it is unfair for someone who “wants to do right to end
up so worse off.”226
Next, the court looked at the responsibility of the creditor, encompassing the
theory of improvident extension of credit.227 Simply stated, improvident extension of
credit is when a creditor knows that a debtor has financial problems and will be
unable to repay the debt but extends credit nonetheless. Much of the rationale from
Discover Bank expresses this idea. For example, the court said that it was “unfair for
a creditor to extend easy credit at stiff terms to someone who clearly was in a
difficult financial predicament.”228 Further, “Discover kept Owens’s account open
and active long after it was painfully obvious that she was never going to be able to
make payments at the expected level.”229 A contract may be equally unenforceable
when a creditor leaves a debtor with little disposable income and presses a demand
for judgment despite being aware of the debtor’s dire financial straits.230 Moreover,
the court also cited an injured party’s duty to mitigate damages to prevent forfeiture
of those that the party could have reasonably avoided.231
Judge Triozzi also applied the doctrine of unjust enrichment in this case.232 Due
to the fact that Discover failed to “even minimally pay attention to Owens’s
circumstances, and for allowing the debt to accumulate unchecked,” the court
determined that a favorable verdict for the plaintiff would create unjust enrichment;
such a verdict would allow Discover to retain money that, in justice and in equity,
belonged to Ruth Owens.233
Finally, the court determined that the agreement between the parties was
unconscionable as it applied to Owens.234 Using the definition of unconscionability
espoused in Williams, the court found that there was an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of Owens and contract terms that were unreasonably favorable to
Discover.235

225

Id.

226

Id.

227

Id.

228

Id.

229

Id.

230
Id. (citing City Fin. Serv. v. Smith, No.97 CVF 00679, 2000 WL 288469 (Ohio Mun.
Ct. Clev. Jan. 4, 2000)).
231

Id. (citing S&D Mech. Constrs., Inc. v. Enting Water Conditioning Sys., Inc., 593
N.E.2d 354 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Geis v. Zylka, 650 N.E.2d 211 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Clev.
1995)).
232

Id.

233

Id. (citing Hummel v. Hummel, 14 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 1938); Seward v. Mentrup, 622
N.E.2d 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)).
234

Id. at 874.

235

Id. 873-74 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1965)).
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The court used several general theories to arrive at what it thought was a fair
result. Instead, it could have used the theory of improvident extension of credit to
arrive at the same conclusion.
C. City Financial Services v. Smith
Discover Bank did not mention “improvident extension of credit,” but the court
cited a case that did: City Financial Services v. Smith.236 In this case, Laura Smith
took out a loan from City Financial Services (“City Financial”) in the amount of
$3,000, plus $104.01 for single credit life insurance and $365.40 for property
insurance, for a total of $3,619.69.237 The interest rate on the loan was 22.5%.238
After Smith received the money, her ex-husband stole it in a fraud scheme.239 Smith
was left holding the debt through no fault of her own.240 Her ex-husband was
arrested and prosecuted but paid no restitution.241 Smith made one payment in the
amount of $355 before going into default on the loan.242 City Financial filed a
breach of contract claim against her.243
The parties agreed on the facts of the case, but the defendant claimed that the
entire loan transaction should be voided based on the theory of “improvident
lending” because the plaintiff knew it was unreasonable to expect the defendant to be
able to pay the terms of the loan given her limited disability income.244 At trial,
evidence showed that Smith had a prior loan with City Financial and was behind on
her payments.245 However, the plaintiff knew that the defendant had a residence that
could secure any future payment upon which she defaulted.246 The court found that
the contract between the parties was unconscionable and unenforceable because the
creditor left the debtor with little disposable income and pressed for a judgment
despite being aware of the debtor’s unfortunate financial position.247
236

City Fin. Serv. v. Smith, No.97 CVF 00679, 2000 WL 288469, at *1 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
Clev. Jan. 4, 2000).
237

Id.

238

Id.

239

Id. After Laura Smith’s husband, Toby Smith, took the money, she contacted the police
and prosecuted him for theft. Id. He was convicted and given a suspended sentence. Id.
There was no evidence that Toby Smith paid Laura Smith any restitution. Id. At the time of
the fraud scheme, Toby Smith was married to another woman and was deceiving her and that
family as well. Id.
240

Id.

241

Id.

242

Id.

243

Id.

244

Id. at *2.

245

Id.

246

Id.

247

Id. Facts at trial indicated that Smith received disability income in the amount of $574
a month and had $355 in monthly expenses. Id. At the time she applied for the second loan,
she also had $6700 in debt on two credit cards. Id. City Financial required at least 35%
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In City Financial Services, the court recognized the term “improvident lending”
but resolved the case on other theories. The term was never mentioned in Discover
Bank, possibly for the following reasons. Improvident extension of credit is a term
generally used by Legal Aid attorneys. Most people in the legal community are
unaware of this theory. In Discover Bank, the defendant, who was impoverished and
likely could have qualified for legal assistance, was not represented by counsel of
any kind but instead chose to represent herself. Therefore, the defense of
improvident extension of credit was never raised on her behalf. Further, while the
court in Discover Bank cited City Financial Services, it is likely that “improvident
lending,” as it was termed in the case, was never fully considered in determining the
outcome of Discover Bank because it was not actually used in deciding the outcome
of City Financial Services.
VIII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The need for a solution to the problem of improvident extension of credit is
clear.248 Judge Triozzi is not the only person who has taken notice of this growing
problem. Consumer advocates and politicians alike have expressed similar concerns.
At a Congressional hearing on the issue of credit card debt, consumer advocate Elgie
Holstein of the Bancard Holders of America explained that there is an economic
level below which consumers should not be extended credit because it not only
hinders the consumer, but the credit card company as well.249 Holstein placed much
of the blame on the large interstate banks and institutions that mass-market credit
cards.250 In comparing loss rates, Holstein stated that the banks that mass-market
credit cards indiscriminately experience the highest rates of loss.251
Senator Jim Sasser agreed with Holstein that not all consumers should be
advanced credit, only those who are creditworthy.252 Sasser expressed the view that,
under the current system, those cardholders who timely pay their bills also suffer.253
People who pay their bills also pay the bills of those who do not in the form of
higher interest rates.254 In Sasser’s opinion, if credit was only advanced to those who

disposable income in order to qualify for a loan. Id. Smith had a disposable income of only
21%. Id. However, City Financial calculated her disposable income to be 36%, 1% higher
than that required to secure a loan, by stating her income to be $718 a month. Id.
248
Statistics show that nearly 40 million people a year are in enough financial trouble due
to credit card debt to take drastic action. Jeanette Joy Fisher, Some Startling Statistics About
American Consumers (December 27, 2005), www.ezinearticles.com/?Some-StartlingStatistics-about-American-Consumers&id=118883. Almost 1.5 million people in the United
States are forced to file for bankruptcy every year, and the same amount will turn to credit
counseling services in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy. Id. The remaining 37 million debtors
will attempt to work out payment plans on their own with their creditors. Id.
249

Amador, supra note 77.

250

Id.

251

Id.

252

Id.

253

Id.

254

Id.
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are creditworthy, rates would be substantially lower, and the banks that advance
credit could still make a reasonable profit.255
Judges in the legal system need to take notice of the opinions in both Discover
Bank and City Financial Services. Courts must revive the theory of improvident
extension of credit that was promoted in the past by scholars such as Vern
Countryman. Consumers, especially low-income, poorly educated consumers, need
to be protected from corporate giants who see cardholders as penalty fees and
interest rates instead of the individuals they are—individuals struggling with
financial difficulties. When verdicts come down in favor of the cardholders, the
consumers will gain power in the contractual relationship, and the credit card
companies will lose some of their power. The playing field will level off, and the
pendulum of power will swing back toward the consumer.
However, common law may not be the strongest solution. Congress should
codify improvident extension of credit to fully protect the consumer by passing a
federal law under its commerce power to clearly define improvident extension of
credit and establish the proper penalties. Congress has a substantial interest in
uniform laws because improvident extension of credit exists in every state. A
federal law may be preferred to a common law solution for several reasons. First, as
of the time of this writing, no case of precedential value exists that rules in favor of
the consumer victim of improvident extension of credit. Also, unlike a common law
defense, a consumer could invoke a federal statute without the difficulty and expense
of hiring a lawyer, thus increasing the availability of a remedy for consumers.
Finally, the uniformity that could be achieved through a federal law would be hard to
achieve in common law where cases are decided in different jurisdictions on a case
by case basis.
Such a statute prohibiting improvident extension of credit could be short in
length and narrowly construed to apply only to situations involving credit card debt
while still encompassing Vern Countryman’s original theory. Legislators could look
to the language of previously proposed legislation, such as that discussed in Part III.
For example, improvident extension of credit could be defined as having four
elements with the following language:
If the court, as a matter of law, finds that a contract was based on
improvident extension of credit, the court may refuse to enforce the
contract. An improvident extension of credit is defined as

255

1.

a contractual extension of credit to a debtor,

2.

where it cannot be reasonably expected that the debtor can repay
the debt according to the terms of the agreement,

3.

in view of the circumstances of the debtor at the time that credit
was extended,

4.

as these circumstances were known to the creditor or would have
been revealed to him on reasonable inquiry prior to credit
extension.

Id.
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The legislators could then decide whether to codify improvident extension of
credit solely as a defense or to draft it as a basis for affirmative relief as well. As
discussed in Part III, section E, Vern Countryman felt that improvident extension of
credit should be a basis for affirmative relief because the improvident debt may have
caused other damages to the debtor.256 For example, the debtor may have defaulted
on other debts.257 For this very reason, Countryman believed that affirmative relief
should also be extended to other creditors who were injured as a result of the
improvident debt.258
IX. CONCLUSION
Improvident extension of credit must be recognized and stopped through the legal
system; otherwise, society will also pay the price.259 George Ritzer and Robert
Manning, prominent sociologists, assert that improvident extension of credit has both
micro and macro effects on society.260 On the micro level, credit problems increase
stress, create mental health problems, and cause family abuse because debt is the
primary contributing factor to divorce and family problems.261 On the macro level,
society must bear the burden of broken homes, dysfunctional families, and people
needing mental health services.262 This leads to a need for more jails, more mental
health services, more children and mothers needing shelter from abuse, more
rehabilitative services, and more taxes to pay for it all.263
Imagine once again that you are impoverished. You are a single parent living in
a small apartment with your kids. You dropped out of high school, and you work a
minimum wage job at the convenient store down the street. Although the bank was
aware of your financial situation, you were able to obtain a credit card. You can
barely pay the minimum balance each month, but you try to pay on time. You use
the card to buy food and clothing for your kids—you never buy new clothes for
yourself. You diligently pay your bill every month, but your car breaks down,
absorbing the funds necessary to make your minimum payment. The fees that you
are charged put you over your credit limit, and you are charged more penalty fees.
Now you are in a hole that you cannot possibly dig yourself out of. That is all it
takes.
Now the telephone calls and letters begin. The fees cause the amount that you
owe to increase exponentially. You may even receive notice of lawsuits,
repossession, or foreclosure, but you do not have a high school education and do not
understand what they mean. You notify the credit card company of your difficulties,
but you continue to pay. You are too proud to file for bankruptcy. You work too
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Countryman, supra note 3, at 20.
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Id.
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Id.
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hard for that. But it is too late, and you are caught in a downward spiral. You have
become a statistic. You have a significantly greater risk of increased stress, family
violence, mental illness, divorce, and suicide. You feel totally alone, and there is no
one to protect you.
It is time to protect those in our community who need protection the most.
Creditors have a right to payment on credit that they honestly and fairly extend to
customers. However, when these creditors know of the financial difficulties of a
consumer and extend credit for the sole purpose of profiting from the consumer’s
misfortune, they must be stopped. Judges and legislators alike must follow the lead
of Judge Triozzi in Discover Bank. Judges must recognize the plight of the
impoverished and create common law recognizing improvident extension of credit
until the time when statutory law can be passed to put an end to the problem of
improvident extension of credit.
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